Abstract. Introduced by Micali, Rabin and Kilian (MRK), the basic primitive of zero-knowledge sets (ZKS) allows a prover to commit to a secret set S so as to be able to prove statements such as x ∈ S or x ∈ S. Chase et al. showed that ZKS protocols are underlain by a cryptographic primitive termed mercurial commitment. A (trapdoor) mercurial commitment has two commitment procedures. At committing time, the committer can choose not to commit to a specific message and rather generate a dummy value which it will be able to softly open to any message without being able to completely open it. Hard commitments, on the other hand, can be hardly or softly opened to only one specific message. At Eurocrypt 2008, Catalano, Fiore and Messina (CFM) introduced an extension called trapdoor qmercurial commitment (qTMC), which allows committing to a vector of q messages. These qTMC schemes are interesting since their openings w.r.t. specific vector positions can be short (ideally, the opening length should not depend on q), which provides zero-knowledge sets with much shorter proofs when such a commitment is combined with a Merkle tree of arity q. The CFM construction notably features short proofs of non-membership as it makes use of a qTMC scheme with short soft openings. A problem left open is that hard openings still have size O(q), which prevents proofs of membership from being as compact as those of non-membership. In this paper, we solve this open problem and describe a new qTMC scheme where hard and soft position-wise openings, both, have constant size. We then show how our scheme is amenable to constructing independent zero-knowledge sets (i.e., ZKS schemes that prevent adversaries from correlating their set to the sets of honest provers, as defined by Gennaro and Micali). Our solution retains the short proof property for this important primitive as well.
Introduction
Introduced by Micali, Rabin and Kilian [21] , zero-knowledge sets (ZKS) are fundamental secure data structures which allow a prover P to commit to a finite set S in such a way that, later on, he will be able to efficiently (and non-interactively) prove statements of the form x ∈ S or x ∈ S without revealing anything else on S, not even its size. Of course, the prover should not be able to cheat and prove different statements about an element x. The more general notion of zero-knowledge elementary databases (ZK-EDB) generalizes zero-knowledge sets in that each element x has an associated value D(x) in the committed database.
In [21] , Micali et al. described a beautiful construction of ZK-EDB based on the discrete logarithm assumption. The MRK scheme relies on the shared random string model (where a random string chosen by some trusted entity is made available to all parties) and suitably uses an extension of Pedersen's trapdoor commitment [23] . In 2005, Chase et al. [10] gave general constructions of zero-knowledge databases and formalized a primitive named mercurial commitment which they proved to give rise to ZK-EDB protocols. The MRK construction turned out to be a particular instance of a general design combining mercurial commitments with a Merkle tree [20] , where each internal node contains a mercurial commitment to its two children.
Informally speaking, mercurial commitments are commitments where the binding property is slightly relaxed in that the committer is allowed to softly open a commitment and say "if the commitment can be opened at all, then it opens to that message". Upon committing, the sender has to decide whether the commitment will be a hard commitment, that can be hard/soft-opened to only one message, or a soft one that can be soft-opened to any arbitrary message without committing the sender to a specific one. Unlike soft commitments that cannot be hard-opened, hard commitments can be opened either in the soft or the hard manner but soft openings can never contradict hard ones. In addition, hard and soft commitments should be computationally indistinguishable.
Related Work. Promptly after the work of Micali, Rabin and Kilian, Ostrovsky, Rackoff and Smith [22] described protocols for generalized queries (beyond membership/non-membership) for committed databases and also show how to add privacy to their schemes. Liskov [18] also extended the construction of Chase et al. [10] to obtain updatable zero-knowledge databases in the random oracle model. Subsequently, Catalano, Dodis and Visconti [8] gave simplified security definitions for (trapdoor) mercurial commitments and notably showed how to construct them out of one-way functions in the shared random string model.
In order to extend the properties of non-malleable commitments to zero-knowledge databases, Gennaro and Micali [15] formalized the notion of independent ZK-EDBs. Informally, this notion prevents adversaries from correlating their committed databases to those produced by honest provers.
More recently, Prabhakaran and Xue [24] defined the related notion of statistically hiding sets that requires the hiding property of zero-knowledge sets to be preserved against unbounded verifiers. At the same time, their notion of zero-knowledge was relaxed to permit unbounded simulators.
At Eurocrypt 2008, Catalano, Fiore and Messina [9] addressed the problem of compressing proofs in ZK-EDB schemes and significantly improved upon earlier proposals.
Our Contribution. The original construction of zero-knowledge database [21, 10] considers a binary Merkle tree of height O(λ), where λ is the security parameter (in such a way that the upper bound on the database size is exponential in λ and leaks no information on its actual size). Each internal node contains a mercurial commitment to (a hash value of) its two children whereas each leaf node is a mercurial commitment to a database entry. The crucial idea is that internal childless nodes contain soft commitments, which keeps the commitment generation phase efficient (i.e., polynomial in λ). A proof of membership for the entry x consists of a sequence of hard openings for commitments appearing in nodes on the path from leaf x to the root. Proofs of non-membership proceed similarly but rather use soft openings along the path.
As noted in [9] , the above approach often results in long proofs, which may be problematic in applications, like mobile Internet connections, where users are charged depending on the number of blocks that they send/receive. To address this issue, Catalano, Fiore and Messina (CFM) suggested to increase the branching factor q of the tree and to use a primitive called trapdoor q-mercurial commitment (qTMC). The latter is like an ordinary mercurial commitment with the difference that it allows committing to a vector of q messages at once. With regular mercurial commitments, increasing the arity of the tree is not appropriate as generating proofs entails to reveal q values (instead of 2) at each level of the tree. However, it becomes interesting with qTMC schemes that can be opened with respect to specific vector positions without having to disclose each one of the q committed messages. The CFM construction makes use of an elegant qTMC scheme where soft commitment openings consist of a single group element, which yields dramatically shorter proofs of non-membership. On the other hand, hard openings unfortunately comprise O(q) elements in the qTMC scheme described in [9] . For this reason, proofs of membership remain significantly longer than proofs of non-membership.
In this paper, we solve a problem left open in [9] and consider a primitive called concise mercurial vector commitment, which is a qTMC scheme allowing to commit to a q-vector in such a way that (1) hard and soft position-wise openings both have constant (i.e., independent of q) size; (2) the committer can hard-open the commitment at position i ∈ {1, . . . , q} without revealing anything on messages at other positions in the vector. We describe a simple and natural example of such scheme. Like the CFM q-mercurial commitment, our realization relies on a specific number theoretic assumption in bilinear groups. Implementing the CFM flat-tree system with our scheme immediately yields very short proofs of membership and while retaining short proofs of non-membership. Assuming that 2 λ is a theoretical bound on the database size, we obtain proofs comprising O(λ/ log(q)) group elements for membership and non-membership. In the CFM system, proofs of membership grow as O(λ · q/ log(q)), which prevents one from compressing proofs of non-membership without incurring a blow-up in the length of proofs of membership. Using our commitment scheme, both kinds of proof can be shortened by increasing q as long as the common reference string (which has size O(q) as in [9] ) is not too large. With q = 128 for instance, proofs do not exceed 2 kB in instantiations using suitable parameters.
In addition, we also show that our qTMC scheme easily lends itself to the construction of independent zero-knowledge databases. To construct such protocols satisfying a strong definition of independence, Gennaro and Micali [15] used multi-trapdoor mercurial commitments that can be seen as families of mercurial commitments (in the same way as multi-trapdoor commitments [14] are families of trapdoor commitments). Modulo appropriate slight modifications, our scheme can be turned into a concise multi-trapdoor qTMC scheme. It thus gives rise to the first ZK-EDB realization that simultaneously provides independence and short proofs.
Organization. Section 2 recalls the definitions of qTMC schemes and zero-knowledge databases. We describe the new q-mercurial commitment scheme and discuss its efficiency impact in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 finally explains how the resulting ZK-EDB scheme can be made independent.
Background

Complexity Assumptions
We use groups (G, G T ) of prime order p with an efficiently computable map e : G × G → G T such that e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab for any (g, h) ∈ G × G, a, b ∈ Z and e(g, h) = 1 G T whenever g, h = 1 G . In this mathematical setting, we rely on a computational assumption previously used in [5, 6] .
Definition 1 ([5]
). Let G be a group of prime order p and g ∈ G. The q-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (q-DHE) problem is, given elements (g, g 1 , . . . , g q , g q+2 , . . . , g 2q ) such that g i = g (α i ) , for i = 1, . . . , q, q + 2, . . . , 2q and where α R ← Z * p , to compute the missing group element g q+1 = g (α q+1 ) .
As noted in [6] , this problem is not easier than the one used in [5] , which is to compute e(g, h) (α q+1 ) on input of the same values and the additional element h ∈ G. The generic hardness of q-DHE is thus implied by the generic security of the family of assumptions described in [4] .
Trapdoor q-Mercurial Commitments
A trapdoor q-mercurial commitment (qTMC) consists of a set of efficient algorithms (qKeygen, qHCom, qHOpen, qHVer, qSCom, qSOpen, qSVer, qFake, qHEquiv, qSEquiv) with the following specifications.
qKeygen(λ, q): takes as input a security parameter λ and the number q of messages that can be committed to in a single commitment. The output is a pair of public/private keys (pk, tk). qHCom pk (m 1 , . . . , m q ): takes as input an ordered tuple of messages. It outputs a hard commitment C to (m 1 , . . . , m q ) under the public key pk and some auxiliary state information aux. qHOpen pk (m, i, aux): is a hard opening algorithm. Given a pair (C, aux) = qHCom pk (m 1 , . . . , m q ), it outputs a hard de-commitment π of C w.r.t. position i if m = m i . If m = m i , it returns ⊥. qHVer pk (m, i, C, π): is the hard verification algorithm. It outputs 1 if π gives evidence that C is a commitment to a sequence (m 1 , . . . , m q ) such that m i = m. Otherwise, it outputs 0. qSCom pk (): is a probabilistic algorithm that generates a soft commitment and some auxiliary information aux. Such a commitment is not associated with a specific sequence of messages. qSOpen pk (m, i, flag, aux): generates a soft de-commitment (a.k.a. "tease") τ of C to the message m at position i. The variable flag ∈ {H, S} indicates whether the state information aux corresponds to a hard commitment (C, aux) = qHCom pk (m 1 , . . . , m q ) or a soft one (C, aux) = qSCom pk (). If flag = H and m = m i , the algorithm returns the error message ⊥. qSVer pk (m, i, C, τ ): returns 1 if τ is a valid soft de-commitment of C to m at position i and 0 otherwise. If τ is valid and C is a hard commitment, its hard opening must be to m at index i. qFake pk,tk (): is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the trapdoor tk and generates a q-fake commitment C and some auxiliary information aux. The commitment C is not bound to any sequence of messages. The q-fake commitment C is similar to a soft de-commitment with the difference that it can be hard-opened using the trapdoor tk. qHEquiv pk,tk (m 1 , . . . , m q , i, aux): is a non-adaptive hard equivocation algorithm. Namely, given (C, aux) = qFake pk,tk (), it generates a hard de-commitment π for C at the i th position of the sequence (m 1 , . . . , m q ). The algorithm is non-adaptive in that the sequence of messages has to be determined once-and-for-all before the execution of qHEquiv. qSEquiv pk,tk (m, i, aux): is a soft equivocation algorithm. Given the auxiliary information aux returned by (C, aux) = qFake pk,tk (), it creates a soft de-commitment τ to m at position i.
Standard trapdoor mercurial commitments are a special case of qTMC schemes where q = 1.
Correctness. The correctness requirements are similar to those of standard mercurial commitments. For any sequence (m 1 , . . . , m q ), these statements must hold with overwhelming probability.
-Given a hard commitment (C, aux) = qHCom pk (m 1 , . . . , m q ), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, we must have qHVer pk (m i , i, C, qHOpen pk (m i , i, aux)) = 1 and qSVer pk (m i , i, C, qSOpen pk (m i , i, H, aux)) = 1. -If (C, aux) = qSCom pk (), then qSVer pk (m i , i, C, qSOpen pk (m i , i, S, aux)) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , q.
-Given (C, aux) = qFake pk,tk (), we must have qSVer pk (m i , i, C, qSEquiv pk,tk (m i , i, aux)) = 1 and qHVer pk (m i , i, C, qHEquiv pk,tk (m 1 , . . . , m q , i, aux)) = 1 for all indices i ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
Security. The security properties of a trapdoor q-mercurial commitment are stated as follows:
-q-Mercurial binding: given the public key pk, it should be computationally infeasible to output a commitment C, an index i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and pairs (m, π), (m ′ , π ′ ) that satisfy either of these two conditions which are respectively termed "hard collision" and "soft collision":
• qHVer pk (m, i, C, π) = 1, qHVer pk (m ′ , i, C, π ′ ) = 1 and m = m ′ .
• qHVer pk (m, i, C, π) = 1, qSVer pk (m ′ , i, C, π ′ ) = 1 and m = m ′ .
-q-Mercurial hiding: on input of pk, no PPT adversary can find a tuple (m 1 , . . . , m q ) and an index i ∈ {1, . . . , q} for which it is able to distinguish (C,
-Equivocations: given the public key pk and the trapdoor tk, no PPT adversary A should be able to win the following games with non-negligible probability. In these games, A aims to distinguish the "real" world from the corresponding "ideal" one. The kind of world that A is faced with depends on a random b R ← {0, 1} flipped by the challenger. If b = 0, the challenger plays the "real" game and provides A with a real commitment/de-commitment tuple. If b = 1, the adversary A rather receives a fake commitment and equivocations. More precisely, A is required to guess the bit b ∈ {0, 1} with no better advantage than 1/2 in the following games:
• q-HHEquivocation: when A chooses a message sequence (m 1 , . . . , m q ), the challenger computes (C, aux) = qHCom pk (m 1 , . . . , m q ) if b = 0 and (C, aux) = qFake pk,tk () if b = 1. In either case, A receives C. When A chooses an index i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, the challenger returns
• q-HSEquivocation: when A chooses a message sequence (m 1 , . . . , m q ), the challenger computes (C, aux) = qHCom pk (m 1 , . . . , m q ) if b = 0 and (C, aux) = qFake pk,tk () if b = 1. In either case, C is given to A who then chooses i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. If b = 0, the challenger replies with
• q-SSEquivocation: if b = 0, the challenger creates a soft commitment (C, aux) = qSCom pk () and hands C to A. If b = 1, A rather obtains a fake commitment C, which is obtained as (C, aux) = qFake pk,tk (). Then, A chooses m ∈ M and i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and gets back
As noted in [8] , giving the trapdoor tk to the adversary at the beginning of each game simplifies the definitions: security in the sense of the above atomic games then implies security in a more complex game where the adversary is playing an arbitrary composition of HHE, HSE and SSE games.
As was also pointed out in [8] in the case of ordinary trapdoor mercurial commitments, any qTMC scheme satisfying the q-HSEquivocation and q-SSEquivocation properties also satisfies the q-mercurial hiding requirement.
In the following, we say that a qTMC scheme is a concise mercurial vector commitment if the output sizes of qHOpen and qSOpen do not depend on q and if, when invoked on the index i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, qHOpen does not reveal any information on messages m j with j = i. The prover and the verifier both take as input a string σ that can be a random string (in which case, the protocol stands in the common random string model) or have a specific structure (in which case we are in the trusted parameters model). An EDB scheme is formally defined by a tuple (CRS-Gen, P1, P2, V) such that:
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-CRS-Gen generates a common reference string σ on input of a security parameter λ.
-P1 is the commitment algorithm that takes as input the database D and σ. It outputs commitment and de-commitment strings (Com, Dec). -P2 is the proving algorithm that, given σ, the commitment/de-commitment pair (Com, Dec) and a key x ∈ {0, 1} * , outputs a proof π x . -V is the verification algorithm that, on input of σ, Com, x and π x , outputs either y (which must be ⊥ if x ∈ [D]) if it is convinced that D(x) = y or bad if it believes that the prover is cheating.
The security requirements are formally defined in appendix A. In a nutshell, they are as follows. Correctness mandates that honestly generated proofs always satisfy the verification test. Soundness requires that provers be unable to come up with a key x and convincing proofs π x , π ′ x such that y = V(σ, Com, x, π x ) = V(σ, Com, x, π x ) = y ′ . Finally, zero-knowledge means that each proof π x only reveals the value D(x) and nothing else: for any computable database D, there must exist a simulator that outputs a simulated reference string σ ′ and a simulated commitment Com ′ that does not depend on D. For any key x ∈ {0, 1} * and with oracle access to D, the simulator should be able to simulate proofs π x that are indistinguishable from real proofs.
A Construction of Concise qTMC Scheme
Our idea is to build on the accumulator of Camenisch, Kohlweiss and Soriente [6] , which is itself inspired by the Boneh-Gentry-Waters broadcast encryption system [5] . In the former, the public key comprises a sequence of group elements (g, g 1 , . . . , g q , g q+2 , . . . , g 2q ), where q is the maximal number of accumulated values and g i = g (α i ) for each i. Elements of V ⊆ {1, . . . , q} are accumulated by computing V = j∈V g q+1−j and the witness for the accumulation of i ∈ V consists of the group element W i = j∈V\{i} g q+1−j+i , which always satisfies e(g i , V ) = e(g, W i ) · e(g 1 , g q ).
To obtain a commitment scheme, we modify this construction in order to accumulate messages m i ∈ Z * p in a position-sensitive manner and we also add some randomness γ ∈ Z p to have a hiding commitment. More precisely, we commit to (m 1 , . . . , m q ) by computing V = g γ · q j=1 g m j q+1−j and obtain a kind of generalized Pedersen commitment [23] . Thanks to the specific choice of base elements however,
−j+i can serve as evidence that m i was the i th committed message as it satisfies the relation e(g i , V ) = e(g, W i ) · e(g 1 , g q ) m i . Moreover, the opening W i at position i does not reveal anything about other components of the committed vector, which is a property that can be useful in other applications.
This commitment can be proved binding under the q-DHE assumption, which would be broken if the adversary was able to produce two distinct openings of V at position i. It is also a trapdoor commitment since anyone holding g q+1 = g (α q+1 ) can trapdoor open a commitment as he likes.
The scheme can further be made mercurial by observing that its binding property disappears if the verification equation is changed into e(g i , V ) = e(g 1 , W i )·e(g 1 , g q ) m i . The key idea is then to use commitments of the form (C, V ) where C = g θ , for some θ ∈ Z p , in hard commitments and C = g θ 1 in soft commitments. The verification equation thus becomes e(g i , V ) = e(C, W i ) · e(g 1 , g q ) m i .
Description. We assume that committed messages are elements of Z * p . In practice, arbitrary messages can be committed to by first applying a collision-resistant hash function with range Z * p .
qKeygen(λ, q): chooses bilinear groups (G, G T ) of prime order p > 2 λ and g
. . , g 2q , where g i = g (α i ) for i = 1, . . . , q, q + 2, . . . , 2q. The public key is defined to be pk = {g, g 1 , . . . , g q , g q+2 , . . . , g 2q } and the trapdoor is tk = g q+1 = g (α q+1 ) .
qHCom pk (m 1 , . . . , m q ): to hard-commit to a sequence (m 1 , . . . , m q ) ∈ (Z * p ) q , this algorithm chooses γ, θ R ← Z p and computes the commitment as the pair
The output is (C, V ) and the auxiliary information is aux = (m 1 , . . . , m q , γ, θ). qHOpen pk (m i , i, aux): parses aux as (m 1 , . . . , m q , γ, θ) and calculates
The hard opening of (C, V ) consists of π = (θ,
Otherwise, it returns 0.
The output is (C, V ) and the auxiliary information is aux = (θ, γ). In either case, the algorithm returns τ = W i ∈ G. qSVer pk (m, i, (C, V ), τ ): parses τ as W i ∈ G and returns 1 if and only if it holds that C, V ∈ G and the first verification equation of (2) is satisfied. qFake pk,tk (): the fake commitment algorithm chooses θ, γ R ← Z p and returns (C, V ) = (g θ , g γ ). The auxiliary information is aux = (θ, γ). qHEquiv pk,tk (m 1 , . . . , m q , i, aux): parses aux as (θ, γ) ∈ (Z p ) 2 . Using the trapdoor tk = g q+1 ∈ G,
qSEquiv pk,tk (m, i, aux): parse aux as (θ, γ) and returns
Correctness. In hard commitments, we can check that properly generated hard de-commitments always satisfy the verification test (2) since
As
). We finally observe that, in any fake commitment (C, V ) = (g θ , g γ ), the hard de-commitment (θ, W i ) successfully passes the verification test as
Security. To prove the security of the scheme, we first notice that it is a "proper" qTMC [8] since, in hard commitments, the soft de-commitment is a proper subset of the hard de-commitment.
Theorem 1. The above scheme is a secure concise qTMC if the q-DHE assumption holds in G.
Proof. We first show the q-mercurial binding property. Let us assume that, given the public key, an adversary A is able to generate soft collisions (since the scheme is "proper", the case of hard collisions immediately follows). That is, A comes up with a commitment (C, V ) ∈ G 2 , an index i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, a valid hard de-commitment π = (θ,
is revealed by the soft collision, which contradicts the q-DHE assumption.
We now turn to the q-HHE, q-HSE and q-SSE equivocation properties (which imply q-mercurial hiding). A fake commitment has the form (C, V ) = (g θ , g γ ) and its hard equivocation to (m i , i) is the pair θ,
Then, the corresponding hard opening of (C, V ) w.r.t. m i at position i should be obtained as
we raise both members of (3) to the power α i , we find that
q+1 ) 1/θ returned by the hard equivocation algorithm can also be written
It comes that fake commitments and hard equivocations have exactly the same distribution as hard commitments and their hard openings.
The q-HSEquivocation property follows from the above arguments (since the scheme is "proper"). To prove the indistinguishability in the q-SSEquivocation game, we note that fake commitments (C, V ) = (g θ , g γ ) have the same distribution as soft ones as they can be written (C, V ) = (gθ 1 , gγ 1 ) whereθ = θ/α andγ = γ/α. Their soft equivocation
q ) 1/θ and has the distribution of a soft opening.
⊓ ⊔
Instantiation with Asymmetric Pairings. It is simple 3 to describe the construction in terms of asymmetric pairings e : G ×Ĝ → G T , where G =Ĝ and an isomorphism ψ :Ĝ → G is efficiently computable. The public key comprises generatorsĝ ∈Ĝ andĝ i for i = 1, . . . , q, q + 2, . . . , 2q. Then, hard (resp. soft) commitments (C, V ) ∈Ĝ × G are pairs of group elements obtained as C =ĝ θ and
,j =i ψ(ĝ q+1−j+i ) m j /θ and they are verified by checking that C =ĝ θ and e(V,ĝ i ) = e(W i , C) · e(ψ(ĝ 1 ),ĝ q ) m i . Using the trapdoorĝ q+1 , fake commitments (C, V ) = (ĝ θ , ψ(ĝ) γ ) can be equivocated by outputting θ and
Implications on the Efficiency of ZK-EDBs
The construction [9] of ZK-EDB from qTMC schemes is detailed in appendix B and goes as follows. Each key x is assigned to a leaf of a q-ary tree of height h (and can be seen as the label of the leaf, expressed in q-ary encoding), so that q h is the theoretical bound on the size of the EDB.
The committing phase is made efficient by pruning subtrees where all leaves correspond to keys that are not in the database. Only the roots (called "frontier nodes" and at least one sibling of which is an ancestor of a leaf in the EDB) of these subtrees are kept in the tree and contain soft q-commitments. For each key x such that D(x) = ⊥, the corresponding leaf contains a standard hard mercurial commitment to a hash value of D(x). As for remaining nodes, each internal one contains a hard q-commitment to messages obtained by hashing its children. The q-commitment at the root then serves as a commitment to the entire EDB.
To convince a verifier that D(x) = v = ⊥ for some key x, the prover generates a proof of membership consisting of hard openings for commitments in nodes on the path connecting leaf x to the root. At each level of the tree, the q-commitment is hard-opened with respect to the position determined by the q-ary encoding of x at that level.
To provide evidence that some key x does not belong to the database (i.e., D(x) = ⊥), the prover first generates the missing portion of the subtree where x lies. Then, it reveals soft openings for all (hard or soft) commitments contained in nodes appearing in the path from x to the root.
As in the original zero-knowledge EDB construction [21] , only storing commitments in subtrees containing leaves x for which D(x) = ⊥ (and soft commitments at nodes that have no descendants) is what allows committing with complexity O(h · |D|) instead of O(q h ).
The advantage of using qTMC schemes and q-ary (with q > 2) trees lies in that proofs can be made much shorter if, at each level, commitments can be opened w.r.t. the required position i ∈ {1, . . . , q} without having to reveal q values. The qTMC scheme of [9] features soft openings consisting of a single group element and, for an appropriate branching factor q, allows reducing proofs of non-membership by 73% in comparison with [21] . On the other hand, hard openings still have length O(q) and proofs of membership thus remain significantly longer than proofs of nonmembership. If h denotes the height of the tree, the former consist of h(q + 4) + 5 elements of G (in an implementation with asymmetric pairings) while the latter only demand 4h + 4 such elements.
If we plug our qTMC scheme into the above construction, proofs of membership become essentially as short as proofs of non-membership. At each internal node, each hard opening only requires to reveal (C, V ) ∈Ĝ × G and (θ, W i ) ∈ Z p × G. At the same time, proofs of non-membership remain as short as in [9] since, at each internal node, the prover only discloses (C, V ) and W i .
To concretely assess proof sizes, we assume (as in [9] ) that elements ofĜ count as two elements 220  176  521  16 32  165  132  643  32 26  135  108  941  64 22  115  92  1501  128 19  100  80  2513  256 16 85 68 4165 Fig. 1 . Required number of group elements per proof of G (since their representation is usually twice as large using suitable parameters and optimizations such as those of [2] ), each one of which costs |p| bits to represent. Then, we find that proofs of membership and non-membership eventually amount to 5h + 5 and 4h + 4 elements of G, respectively. These short hard openings allow us to increase the branching factor of the tree as long as the length of the common reference string is deemed acceptable. The table of figure 1 summarizes the proof lengths (expressed in numbers of G elements and in comparison with [9] ) for various branching factors and assuming that q h ≈ 2 128 theoretically bounds the EDB's size. In the MRK construction, membership (resp. non-membership) can be proved using 773 (resp. 644) group elements. The best tradeoff achieved in [9] was for q = 8, where proofs of non-membership could be reduced to 176 elements but proofs of membership still took 521 elements. With q = 8, we have equally short proofs of non-membership and only need 220 elements to prove membership, which improves CFM [9] by about 57% and MRK [21] by 71%.
Moreover, we can shorten both kinds of proof by increasing q: with q = 128 for instance, no more than 100 group elements (or 13% of the original length achieved in [21] ) are needed to prove membership whereas 2513 elements are necessary in [9] . Instantiating our scheme with BarretoNaehrig curves [2] yields proofs of less than 2 kB when q = 128. For such relatively small values of q, Cheon's attack [12] does not require to increase the security parameter λ and it is reasonable to use groups (G,Ĝ) where elements of G have a 161-bit representation.
Achieving Strong Independence
In [15] , Gennaro and Micali formalized the notion of independent zero-knowledge EDBs which requires that adversaries be unable to correlate their database to those created by honest provers.
The strongest flavor of independence considers two-stage adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ). First, A 1 observes ℓ honest provers' commitments (Com 1 , . . . , Com ℓ ) and queries proofs for keys of her choice in underlying databases D 1 , . . . , D ℓ before outputting her own commitment Com. Then, two copies of A 2 are executed: in the first one, A 2 is given oracle access to provers that "open" Com i w.r.t D i whereas, in the second run, A 2 has access to provers for different 4 databases D ′ i that agree with D i for the set Q i of queries made by A 1 . Eventually, both executions of A 2 end with A 2 outputting a key x, which is identical in both runs, and a proof π x . The resulting database value D(x) is required to be the same in the two copies, meaning that it was fixed at the end of the committing stage.
In the strongest definition of [15] , A 1 is allowed to copy one of the honest provers' commitment (say Com
Definition 2.
[15] A ZK-EDB protocol is strongly independent if, for any polynomial ℓ, any PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and any databases D 1 , . . . , D ℓ , D ′ 1 , . . . , D ′ ℓ , the following probability is negligible.
where Q i (resp. Q ′ i ) stands for the list of queries made by A 1 (resp. A 2 ) to Sim An efficient construction of independent ZK-EDB was proved in [15] to satisfy the above definition under the strong RSA assumption. It was obtained by extending Gennaro's multi-trapdoor commitment scheme [14] and making it mercurial.
We show how to turn our qTMC scheme into a multi-trapdoor q-mercurial commitment scheme that yields strongly independent EDBs with short proofs.
Multi-Trapdoor q-Mercurial Commitments. A multi-trapdoor qTMC can be seen as extending qTMC schemes in the same way as multi-trapdoor commitments generalize ordinary trapdoor commitments. It can be defined as a family of trapdoor q-mercurial commitments, each member of which is identified by a string tag and has its own trapdoor tk tag . The latter is generated from tag using a master trapdoor T K that matches the master public key P K.
qKeygen(λ, q): has the same specification as in section 2.2 but, in addition to the master key pair (P K, T K), it outputs the description of a tag space T . qHCom P K (m 1 , . . . , m q , tag): given an ordered tuple (m 1 , . . . , m q ) and tag ∈ T , this algorithm outputs a hard commitment C under (P K, tag) and some auxiliary state information aux. qHOpen P K (m, i, tag, aux): given a pair (C, aux) = qHCom P K (m 1 , . . . , m q , tag), this algorithm outputs a hard de-commitment π of C w.r.t. position i if m = m i . If m = m i , it returns ⊥. qHVer P K (m, i, C, tag, π): outputs 1 if and only if π gives evidence that, under the tag tag, C is bound to a sequence (m 1 , . . . , m q ) such that m i = m. qSCom P K (): generates a soft commitment and some auxiliary information aux. Such a commitment is not associated with any specific messages or tag. qSOpen P K (m, i, flag, tag, aux): generates a soft de-commitment τ of C to m at position i and w.r.t. tag. The variable flag ∈ {H, S} indicates whether τ pertains to a hard commitment (C, aux) = qHCom P K (m 1 , . . . , m q , tag) or a soft commitment (C, aux) = qSCom P K (). If flag = H and m = m i , the algorithm returns ⊥.
using the master trapdoor T K. qFake P K,tktag (): outputs a q-fake commitment C and some auxiliary state information aux. qHEquiv P K,tktag (m 1 , . . . , m q , i, tag, aux): given (C, aux) = qFake P K,tktag (), this algorithm generates a hard de-commitment π for C and tag ∈ T at the i th position of the sequence (m 1 , . . . , m q ). The sequence of messages has to be determined once-and-for-all before the execution of qHEquiv. qSEquiv P K,tktag (m, i, tag, aux): using the trapdoor tk tag and the state information aux returned by (C, aux) = qFake P K,tktag (), this algorithm creates a soft de-commitment τ to m at position i and w.r.t. tag ∈ T .
Again, we call such a scheme concise if it satisfies the same conditions as those mentioned at the end of section 2.2. The security properties are expressed by naturally requiring the q-mercurial hiding and equivocation properties to hold for each tag ∈ T . In equivocation games, the adversary should be unable to distinguish the two games even knowing the master trapdoor T K. As for the q-mercurial binding property, it states that no PPT adversary A should have non-negligible advantage in this game:
q-Mercurial binding game: A chooses strings tag 1 , . . . , tag ℓ ∈ T . Then, the challenger generates a master key pair (T K, P K) ← qKeygen(λ, q) and gives P K to A who starts invoking a trapdoor oracle T G: the latter receives tag ∈ {tag 1 , . . . , tag ℓ } and returns tk tag ← qTrapGen P K,T K (tag). Eventually, A chooses a family tag ⋆ ∈ T \{tag 1 , . . . , tag ℓ } for which she aims to generate a collision: she wins if she outputs C, an index i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and pairs (m, π), (m ′ , π ′ ) (resp. (m, π) and (m ′ , τ )) such that qHVer P K (m, i, C, tag ⋆ , π) = 1 and
As in [14] , the latter definition captures security in a non-adaptive sense in that the adversary chooses tag 1 , . . . , tag ℓ before seeing the public key P K. As noted in [13, 19] in the case of ordinary multi-trapdoor commitments, some applications might require to consider a notion of adaptive security where, much in the fashion of identity-based trapdoor commitments [1, 7] , the adversary can query T G in an adaptive fashion. In the present context, non-adaptive security suffices.
A Construction of Multi-Trapdoor qTMC. The construction combines the qTMC scheme of section 3 with a programmable hash function H G : T → G and techniques that were introduced in [3] . Programmable hash functions, as formalized by Hofheinz and Kiltz [17] , are designed in such a way that a trapdoor information makes it possible to relate the output H G (M ), which lies in a group G, to computable values
there is a non-negligible probability that b M i = 0 and b M ′ j = 0 for i = 1, . . . , m and j = 1, . . . , n. The number theoretic hash function used in [11, 25] is an example of such a (1, ℓ)-programmable hash function, for some polynomial ℓ.
qKeygen(λ, q): is as in section 3 but the algorithm also chooses a tag space T = {0, 1} L and a (1, ℓ)-programmable hash function H G : T → G for some polynomials ℓ, L. The public key is P K = {T , g, g 1 , . . . , g q , g q+2 , . . . , g 2q , H G } and the master trapdoor is T K = g q+1 = g (α q+1 ) .
The output is (C, V ) and the auxiliary information is aux = (m 1 , . . . , m q , γ, θ) . qHOpen P K (m i , i, tag, aux): parses aux as (m 1 , . . . , m q , γ, θ), chooses r R ← Z * p and computes
The hard opening of (C, V ) with respect to tag ∈ T is the triple π = (θ,
and returns 1 if C, V ∈ G and relations (5) are both satisfied. Otherwise, it returns 0.
The output is (C, V ) and the auxiliary information is aux = (θ, γ). is parsed as (m 1 , . . . , m q , γ, θ) . The algorithm returns ⊥ if m = m i . Otherwise, the soft opening τ = (W i , Z i ) is generated as per (4) . If flag = S, the algorithm parses aux as (θ, γ) and soft-decommits to m using
where r R ← Z * p . In either case, the algorithm returns τ = (W i , Z i ) ∈ G 2 . qSVer pk (m, i, (C, V ), τ, tag): parses τ as (W i , Z i ) ∈ G and returns 1 if and only if C, V ∈ G and the first verification equation of (5) is satisfied. qTrapGen P K,T K (tag): given the master trapdoor T K = g q+1 , a trapdoor for tag ∈ T is computed tk tag = (t tag,1 , t tag,2 ) = (g q+1 · H G (tag) s , g −s ) for a random s R ← Z * p . qFake P K,tktag (): outputs a pair (C, V ) = (g θ , g γ ), where θ, γ R ← Z * p , and retains the state information aux = (θ, γ). qHEquiv P K,tktag (m 1 , . . . , m q , i, tag, aux): parses aux as (θ, γ) ∈ (Z * p ) 2 and the trapdoor tk tag as (t tag,1 , t tag,2 ) ∈ G 2 . It picks r R ← Z * p and computes
The de-commitment is π = (θ,
, where r ′ = −sm i +r. qSEquiv P K,tktag (m, i, tag, aux): parse aux as (θ, γ) and computes (W i , Z i ) as in qHEquiv P K,tktag .
Theorem 2. The scheme is a concise multi-trapdoor qTMC if the q-DHE assumption holds.
Proof. Given in appendix D.
⊓ ⊔ Strongly Independent ZK-EDBs from Multi-Trapdoor qTMC. Following [15] , a multitrapdoor qTMC can be combined with a digital signature and a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → T to give a strongly independent ZK-EDB. To commit to a database D, the prover first generates a key pair (SK, VK) for an existentially unforgeable (as defined in appendix C) signature scheme Σ = (G, S, V) [16] . The commitment string is (Com, VK), where all commitments are produced using the qTMC family (with q = 1 at the leaves and q > 1 at internal nodes) indexed by the tag H(VK). To generate a proof for some key x, the prover generates a proof π x (by opening the appropriate commitments using Dec) and outputs π x and sig x = S(SK, (Com, x)). Verification entails to check π x and that V(sig x , VK, (Com, x)) = 1. The security proof of this scheme (detailed in appendix E) is similar to that of theorem 3 in [15] .
A Security Properties of Zero-Knowledge Databases
The completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties of ZK-EDBs are formally stated as follows.
Completeness: For all databases D and for all keys x, it must hold that
for some negligible function ν. Soundness: For all keys x and for any probabilistic poly-time algorithm P ′ , the following probability is negligible:
Zero-knowledge: for any PPT adversary A and any efficiently computable database D, there must exist an efficient simulator (Sim 0 , Sim 1 , Sim D 2 ) such that the outputs of the following experiments are indistinguishable:
Real experiment:
The output is (σ, x 1 , π 1 , . . . , x n , π n ).
Ideal experiment:
In the above, Sim 
B Zero-Knowledge Elementary Databases from qTMC Schemes
The common reference string σ = (pk, pkm, H) consists of the public key pk of a trapdoor qmercurial commitment scheme QT MC, the public key pkm of an ordinary trapdoor mercurial commitment MC (which can be an instance of the qTMC with q = 1) and the description of a collision-resistant hash function H, the domain of which does not include 0.
The notations of this section are close to the ones of [21, 9] : we denote by T h the complete q-ary tree of height h and q h leaves. If U h is a universe of size q h , its associated tree T h is obtained by assigning each element x ∈ U h to a leaf of T h and by labeling each node using the q-ary encoding of x ∈ U h . The label of the root is the empty string ǫ and, if v is a non-leaf node, its children are labeled as v1, . . . , vq. For each node v, parent(v) denotes v's father in the tree and, when u = parent(v), index u (v) is the index of v when numbering u's children from 1 to q in a left-to-right order. For each leaf node H(x), we also call P AT H (H(x) ) the set of nodes on the path from H(x) to the root, not counting H(x) and ǫ themselves. For any S ⊆ U h , T REE(S) denotes the subtree of T h containing nodes on paths that connect elements of S to the root (in other words, T REE(S) = S ∪ {P AT H(v)|v ∈ S}). Also, F RON T IER(S) will be used to denote the set {v : v ∈ S ∧ parent(v) ∈ T REE(S)}.
In [9] , Catalano et al. generalize the ZK-EDB construction of [10] as follows.
CRS-Gen(λ) : runs (pk, tk) ← qKeygen(λ, q), (pkm, tkm) ← qKeygen(λ, 1) and discards (tk, tkm).
It also chooses a collision-resistant hash function H and sets σ = (pk, pkm, H).
P1(σ, D)
: the committer conducts the following steps. , aux H(x) ) = qHCom pkm (n H(x) ) and set m H(x) = H(C H(x) ). 3. For each internal node u ∈ T such that u ∈ F RON T IER(S), set (C u , aux u ) = qSCom pk (). 4. For each internal node u ∈ T REE(S) and in a bottom-up order, compute a hard qcommitment (C u , aux u ) = qHCom pk (m u1 , . . . , m uq ) and, if u = ǫ, set m u = H(C u ). For each u ∈ T REE(S), retain the state information aux u . 5. Output the commitment string Com = C ǫ and Dec = {aux u |u ∈ T }. The hash function of Chaum et al. [11] , that hashes L-bit stings M = m 1 · · · m L ∈ {0, 1} L by mapping them onto H κ,G (M ) = u 0 · L k=1 u m k k using public group elements (u 0 , . . . , u L ), is known [25] to provide such a (1, ℓ, 0, δ)-programmable hash function where δ = 1/(8ℓ(L + 1) ), for some polynomial ℓ. Using a different technique, Hofheinz and Kiltz [17] showed how to increase the probability δ to O(1/(ℓ √ L)).
D Proof of Theorem 2
We first show the correctness of the scheme. Hard commitments (C, V ) = g θ , g γ · hash function H G : T → G such that, for any tag ∈ T , H G (tag) = g atag · g , for any tag 1 , . . . , tag ℓ and tag ⋆ ∈ {tag 1 , . . . , tag ℓ }, it holds with non-negligible probability δ that b tag i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , ℓ whereas b tag ⋆ = 0. Therefore, if tag 1 , . . . , tag ℓ are the tags that A adaptively queries to the T G oracle, B is able to compute tk tag i = (t tag i ,1 , t tag i ,2 ) = (g q+1 · H G (tag i )r, g −r ) using the technique of [3] : it picks r
